We investigate the magnitude and the persistence of the effect of credit constraints on the growth of exports at a micro level. We develop a model showing credit constraints play a key role in early stages of exporting, with their role on the growth rate of exports diminishing as exporting continues. Our empirical results using data on exports to twelve European Union countries and the U.S. at the product level confirm the model's predictions: exports from less developed financial systems and from firms more reliant on external financing and with more tangible assets grow faster, while the growth rate decreases with age and converges across countries with age. The effect of credit constraints on the growth of exports disappears relatively quickly, within the first three years of exporting.
Introduction
Firms have two basic sources of financing their activities: internally from retained earnings or externally by borrowing from banks and other financial institutions. The ease with which firms are able to access financial assets has a great bearing on what firms can accomplish. Credit constraints have been shown to be an important determinant of international trade flows (Beck 2002 , Manova 2008 , 2010 . However, the dynamic role of these effects and their persistence at the firm level, which is an important factor for policy recommendations, is yet to be explored.
In this paper we build a model which allows us to examine the role of credit constraints in a dynamic setting -namely their effect on the growth rate of exports and the persistence of that effect. We find credit constraints play an important role in the growth of exports in early stages of exporting, but that effect is not persistent.
The lack of attention paid to the persistence of credit constraints is a consequence of the modeling strategy adopted in many papers in this literature. Credit constraints are usually set exogenously for a given country. At best they are endogenized on the efficiency of a country's financial system or capital abundance. Since none of these factors are likely to change much over time, the persistence of credit constraints' effects is implicitly built into such models. Indeed, if credit constraints matter at any given point of time and the severity of credit constraints varies very little over time, the impact of credit constraints is persistent.
While average credit constraints in a given country might indeed be robust over time, this is not necessarily the case from the perspective of an individual firm. The severity of credit constraints faced by a particular firm may vary dramatically even in a short period, depending on the firm's performance. A firm attempting to export for the first time might face rather unfavorable financing terms due to skepticism of lenders towards a first-time exporter. However, if the exporter proves to be successful, it can improve the terms of financing. As long as the early success is positively related to the future performance, the perceived riskiness of the firm's exporting activity will decrease. The successful firm will have an easier time financing its activities either by its current lender (and be evaluated as a lower lending risk) or by finding new sources (possibly international or internal) which become available because of its success.
For instance, a new Chilean exporter of wine to the U.S. might originally be considered a riskier borrower than a new French exporter, both because of its higher risk and the lower efficiency of the Chilean financial system. As a result its initial footprint in the U.S. will be smaller. However, for exporting firms which succeeded in establishing their presence in the U.S., the country of origin plays a much lesser role from the credit risk perspective. In addition, established exporters are no longer bound by the credit conditions of their home country. As a result, established French and Chilean exporters will have access to the same credit sources and conditions. This provides the Chilean exporter with an opportunity to catch up with the French exporter by growing faster. Over time the domestic credit constraints will matter to a much lesser degree, if at all.
We capture this idea by building a stylized dynamic partial equilibrium model of a representative firm in which the rigidity of credit constraints is a function of two factors: (i) the efficiency of its domestic financial institutions and (ii) the level of risk associated with the activity requiring external financing. Both factors affect the size and the cost of a loan a firm can acquire, with better financial systems and less risky activities resulting in larger and cheaper loans for new exporters. We conjecture that after establishing itself as a successful exporter, a firm can improve the terms of credit by (i) accessing international financial markets and (ii) greatly reducing the perceived risk associated with its exporting. As a result, a firm which starts with worse initial terms of credit, but manages to succeed, will see its exports grow at a higher rate.
At the industry level this effect will be more pronounced for countries with a shorter history of exports in the industry, since they will have a higher share of firms transitioning from new and unproven exporters to experienced and successful ones. 1 As the duration of exports increases, however, financial constraints the exporter faces in its home country will matter less and less for export growth and, as a result, export growth rates will converge across exporters.
Empirically we test the predictions of our model by using annual exports to twelve European Union members and the United States from all countries in the world at a highly disaggregated product level: 8-digit Common Nomenclature in the case of the EU and 10-digit Harmonized System in the case of the U.S. Our empirical results confirm the predictions derived from the model for every country in our sample. Our model predicts that the growth rate of exports increases in the interest rate and the servicing cost of a loan which we proxy with measures of financial development and reliance of firms on external financing. Exports from countries with poorer financial systems grow faster. Exports of products more reliant on external financing grow faster as do those produced by sectors with more tangible assets. Exports which begin with lower volumes grow faster. While credit constraints determine growth rates initially, their role decreases and largely disappears with the duration of exporting. Thus, we find that the role of credit constraints is not persistent with credit constraints no longer determining the growth rate of exports beyond the initial 2-3 years. As predicted by our model, we find that growth rates converge across all exporters over time.
Literature Review
We make a contribution to a rich literature on the role of credit constraints in international trade.
Our model is similar in spirit to that of Manova (2010) and Feenstra, Lu, and Yi (2010) who focus on on external sources of credit. Chaney (2005) focuses on internal financing of activities and models liquidity-constrained heterogeneous firms. In the presence of internal financing only, credit constraints reduce the extensive margin, but have no effect on the intensive margin.
Manova (2010) models credit-constrained heterogeneous firms based in countries with different levels of financial development and in sectors of varying degree of financial vulnerability. She finds that countries with well developed financial systems are more likely to export bilaterally and do so with larger volumes, especially in industries more reliant on external financing or with few assets they can use for collateral. Feenstra, Lu, and Yi (2010) model why credit constraints arise in the first place by showing banks lend less than firms need for optimal production in order to maintain incentive compatibility. Similar to Chaney (2005) and Manova (2010) , they show credit constraints reduce exports on the extensive margin, a result supported by data on Chinese firms.
Our effort differs from both Manova (2010) and Feenstra, Lu, and Yi (2010) in that we model a representative firm. Unlike Manova (2010), our focus is not on the extensive margin or the level of the intensive margins, but on the growth along the intensive margin. The focus on growth implies that we need to keep track of every single export relationship taking into account its complete history, a novel feature of our approach. 2 As a result, our model is dynamic by necessity, unlike most models of credit constraints in the international trade literature. Some of the implications of our model are in line with Manova (2010) . Our model predicts that more credit constrained firms will have smaller volumes of exports in the first year. While Manova 
Theoretical Framework
Consider a world consisting of e = 1, 2, ..., E exporting countries and one importer of differentiated varieties. The latter, referred to as Home and indexed by h, exports a numeraire good in return. In any given year exports from country e will be attempted by both incumbent firms and new entrants. The number of new firms attempting to export from country e in any given year is assumed to be constant and is denoted by n e . Note that n e is allowed to vary across exporters, which captures cross-country differences in terms of size, ability to produce new varieties, etc.
We now present a dynamic partial equilibrium model which allows us to examine the success of new and incumbent exporters of a particular product, a country's total exports of that product, and the growth rate of said total exports.
Preferences and Information Dynamics
Consider a representative consumer in Home, whose preferences in any given year y are given by a quasi-linear utility function over many non-durable differentiated varieties indexed by v and a numeraire good:
where λ y is a year-specific preference parameter, x yvet is an individual consumption of variety v imported from country e for year t, and z y is an individual consumption of the numeraire.
D vet is a binary preference parameter defined as:
where δ vet is a stochastic variable measuring the consumer's perception or image of variety v The image δ vet captures a firm's ability to match its product's characteristics to the representative consumer preferences. All new exporters from a given country e have the same expected image because they face equal access to resources, technology, and information. However, their realized images may differ because individual firms may make different choices and consumer's taste is stochastic. Of course, we assume that the expected image of new producers varies across exporting countries because of natural differences in access to resources, technology, information, and other factors determining comparative advantage. 4 To formalize, an image of a new (t = 0) variety v produced in country e, δ ve0 , is uniformly dis-tributed over a country-specific support [0, d e ]. 5 The corresponding probability density function is given by:
From equations (2) and (3) the corresponding probability of 'success' of a new variety v produced in country e is then given by:
with the corresponding probability of failure given by:
For a new variety, the probability of success increases in the length of the support d e , which represents the best possible match between the characteristics of country e's new variety and consumer preferences. Since the probability depends only on exporter parameter d e , it is equal for all new varieties exported by a given country.
In each period consumers decide whether to buy a variety from a given producer. Producers, on the other hand, use all available information to match product characteristics to consumer preferences. Naturally, an established producer will have access to a better information set due to its exporting experience and direct feedback from consumers. The information obtained through its presence in Home's market dominates any information available to new firms. Thus, the exporting country's reputation becomes irrelevant for the incumbent exporters. Analytically it 5 We use the uniform distribution due to its analytical simplicity and the possibility to provide an intuitive interpretation of its upper bound (see below). However, the analysis can be easily extended to a more general family of distributions.
is reflected in the new distribution of the variable δ vet for t > 0:
where experience-based reputation corresponds to a larger upper bound of variety's image:
Note that the length of the support for incumbent exporters is symmetric across countries. For simplicity we assume that gaining more experience does not affect the chances of a firm (i.e.,
The main qualitative results of our model are robust to allowing the upper support to be increasing in experience, e.g.,
From equation (5), the probability of success of incumbent firms is larger and does not depend on the country of origin:
Alternatively, the probability of failure is lower for incumbent exporters,
Production
Each firm produces its own variety, and the firm identity is indistinguishable from the variety it produces. Labor is the only factor of production. Country e is endowed with L e units of labor which are supplied inelastically. The numeraire sector is characterized by perfect competition and constant returns to scale. One unit of labor can produce w e units of the numeraire good, which is traded at zero cost. We assume that the numeraire sector is large enough for all countries to have a strictly positive output. This sets the wage equal to w e in terms of the numeraire. The introduction of the numeraire good in the model simplifies the balance of trade calculation and ties the wage to the productivity in the numeraire sector.
All differentiated goods are produced with the same cost function:
where l yvet is the amount of labor used in production of variety v by country e in year y of duration of t years, and Q yvet is the quantity of that variety. Exporting variety v from country e is subject to Samuelson iceberg transportation costs. That is, to deliver one unit of variety v the exporter has to ship τ e > 1 units, where (τ e − 1) is lost in transit. The production cost has to be incurred before observing the realization of the demand parameter D vet . A firm borrows an 0 < η < 1 share of the production cost from the banking sector and finances the remaining (1 − η) share from its own savings.
Banking Sector
The banking sector is perfectly competitive with the opportunity cost interest rate equal to zero. 6 As a result banks charge a zero-profit interest rate, r et , which varies across countries and experience levels of firms. A bank bears the cost of assessing and servicing the loan, in proportion to the amount of the loan. Let φ e and φ denote this cost on a per dollar basis for a loan to new and incumbent exporters.
A firm would only apply for a loan if the expected profit is non-negative meaning that the 6 Feenstra et al. (2010) make similar assumptions about firms obtaining loans from the banking sector to finance their costs. They assume a monopoly bank with an opportunity cost interest rate i > 0. Our qualitative results will not change if we assume the same as long as the opportunity cost interest rate is positively correlated with the probability of failure of new varieties across countries.
profit under positive demand (D vet = 1) is strictly positive. Thus, if D vet = 1, the firm will repay the loan and end up with a positive profit. If, on the other hand, the demand is zero (D vet = 1), the firm will announce itself bankrupt and will not repay. 7 This means that the bank will face a default on a new loan with probability k/d e , but with probability k/d on incumbent ones. In the case of a default a firm from country e pays back s vet ≤ 1 on each dollar borrowed for variety v and experience of t years, which represents the share of tangible assets in the total cost of the firm. We assume that in the first period the collateral, denoted by s e0 , consists of the firm's tangible assets only and is industry specific. After the first period, the collateral s et for t > 0 consists of both s e0 plus profits from the previous periods. For simplicity, we assume that s et is exogenous to s e0 . 8 
Market Equilibrium
In this section we assume that the parameters of the model are such that a potential entrant earns a positive expected profit. To put it differently, the markets are attractive enough to induce new firms to attempt exporting.
We start by finding the equilibrium interest rate r e0 at which a country e's bank would lend to a producer of a new variety. Given that the bank operates under zero-profit, the present value of each dollar loaned should equal its expected revenue:
From the above equation the corresponding equilibrium interest rate is given by:
As we can see, the bank uses the information on the probability of failure of a new variety when setting the corresponding interest rate r e0 . Imagine a third party, which cannot not observe the probability of firm's failure, but can observe the interest rate. Then it still can calculate the probability of failure from the interest rate:
This will be useful for our predictions and empirical analysis.
The expected cost of production (in terms of the numeraire) of country e's new variety v is given by:
financed with the loan
By substituting equation (7) for the expected cost share financed by the loan, we obtain:
Recall that the firm earns positive revenue in the case of a success, D ve0 = 1, and zero revenue in case of failure, D ve0 = 0. The expected profit function is then given by:
where p yve0 and Q yve0 are delivered price and quantity produced, and τ e is the Samuelson iceberg transportation cost. By taking the first order conditions with respect to the delivered price, we get a familiar expression for the delivered price:
Under the quasi-concave utility function and constant marginal cost, the price obtained in (11) is a unique local profit maximizer for any positive level of output. From the utility function
(1), the profit-maximizing quantity is given by:
For incumbent firms, the equilibrium price and quantity are obtained in a similar manner:
The price does not depend on the demand parameter of a given year y, λ y , and, thus, in what follows we can use p vet instead of p yvet ∀y.
Aggregate Exports and Growth at the Product Level
Since data we will use in our empirical analysis is recorded at the product level preventing us from observing each firm, we focus on aggregate product-level export flows from a given country e to the Home country. In order to simplify our notation, we have suppressed the product index in all expressions pertaining to aggregated exports. In other words, all such expressions pertain to exports of different varieties of the same product, not aggregated exports of a country across all products. In any given year y, aggregate exports of a product from country e depend on the duration of exports from e since they are composed of exports from new firms as well as incumbents. Thus, for a country with T years of successful exporting, aggregate exports in year y can be calculated as:
After using the equilibrium values for prices (equations 11 and 13) and quantities (equations 12 and 13), and rearranging the terms, we get:
Since we are interested in the growth of exports, the growth rate is given by:
By substituting the probability of failure of new varieties, k de with equation (9), we obtain the following expression for the growth of exports of a particular product exported by country e:
Predictions
We now formulate testable predictions. Following directly from equation (14), the number of varieties exported from country e will increase over the years (provided that exports from country e are positive). 9 The total value of exports, however, might either increase or decrease depending on the year-specific demand shock λ y . Thus, in terms of aggregate value, our predictions below are valid for instances of both positive and negative growth. Our first proposition ties export growth to financial market parameters. Proof. Follows directly from equation (17) .
Let us explain the intuition behind the Proposition 1. Ceteris paribus, higher interest rate r e0 indicates a higher level of risk associated will lending money to new exporters, and as result higher production costs for new exporters. New firms in countries with high r e0 will start with smaller exports, but if successful, will grow faster. Similarly, higher servicing fee will also increase production costs of new exporters and reduce their initial size. Finally, higher asset tangibility increases the amount of collateral a firm can use for a loan. At first glance higher asset tangibility should decrease the cost of borrowing. However, in the proposition above we study the effect of higher asset tangibility controlling for other effects, including the interest rate. For a given interest rate, higher asset tangibility indicates higher level of risk associated with a given loan.
Thus lower optimal size of exporting by a new firm (as indicated by equation 12). 10 To be more specific about the role of asset tangibility, consider two scenarios, 1 and 2, with the same interest rate r, but different asset tangibilities, s 1 = 0.2 and s 2 = 0.4. Both industries face the same interest rate, r, in equilibrium. Given equation (7), the equilibrium zero-profit interest rate should satisfy the same condition for both scenarios:
where Pr(D ie0 = 0) is the probability of failure in scenario i = 1, 2 in the firm's first year of exporting. Given the values of asset tangibility, the bank recovers 20 cents on a dollar in scenario 1 and 40 cents on a dollar in scenario 2 in case of failure. From the above equations,
). In other words, for a given interest rate, higher asset tangibility indicates a higher probability of failure on a firm level and higher growth rate at the sectoral level.
Our next proposition concerns the dynamics of growth rates for a given exporter and across all exporters.
Proposition 2 Ceteris paribus, export growth rates a) decrease with duration; b) converge across exporters as relationships age.
Proof. Follows directly from equation (16).
10 In our data, the measure of asset tangibility does not include profits from the previous activity. Thus, when testing our model, we ignore the effect of set for t > 0 on export growth rates. Also, empirically the asset tangibility is sector-specific, whereas interest is country-specific. This will allow us to evaluate the effect of asset tangibility in a given country across sectors.
Our last proposition examines the persistence of the effect of credit constraints as the export relationship survives. As the duration of exports, measured by T , from country e increases, the share of new firms in the total mass of exporters decreases, and so does the effect of credit constraints on export growth. Thus, over time, the growth rate of exports depends less on the country of origin's credit constraints and may become independent of them.
Proposition 3 Ceteris paribus, the longer is the duration of exports from country e, the smaller is the dependence of the growth rate on the a) probability of success of new varieties from country e, (1 − k/d e ); b) asset tangibility of producers of new varieties, the interest rate charged by banks in the first period, and banks' servicing fees for new varieties.
Proof. Part (a) follows from equation (16):
where ln 1 −
Data
We examine the validity of our model using product level data on exports to the United States In the eighteen years of data there are 34,761,491 annual observations across the thirteen countries. Since our model pays particular attention to the entire history of an export relationship, we convert annual data to spells, or episodes with two or more continuous years of positive exports between two countries. There are a total of 12,566,539 exporting spells. Since a relationship may have more than one spell of service, the number of spells exceeds the number of relationships, which is 7,849,250 resulting in 1.6 spells per relationship.
Our investigation imposes two limits on data we can use. The distribution of gross growth rates is very skewed for every country. The average annual growth rate for the U.S. is an already staggering 620%, while Portugal has the largest average growth rate of 3,313%. Only in the case of the U.S. is the average growth rate slightly below the 90 th percentile, while in every other case it is above at least the 90 th percentile. The median growth rates are much more reasonable in magnitude, with the U.S. having the largest median growth rate of 9% and Portugal having the lowest one at 3% along with Ireland. The EU 12 countries have a combined median growth rate of 7%. Such skewed distributions are not uncommon in product-level trade data. Besedeš (2008) shows that the distribution of the volume of exports to the U.S. in the first year of a relationship is similarly skewed with the mean volume 12 The net growth rate is calculated as g = (exports t+1 − exports t )/exports t .
around the 90 th percentile of the distribution. Given the skewness of the distribution of growth rates, we use the natural logarithm of the growth rate in all regressions. 13 
Taking the Model to Data
In the absence of direct measures of credit constraints (asset tangibility, interest rates, and banks' servicing fees) at the firm or product level, we use three proxy variables. We use two measures defined as the share of net property, plant, and equipment in total book-value assets for the median firm in a sector. It corresponds to asset tangibility as defined in our model, with the difference being that it is measured at the sectoral level, rather than the firm level.
We use external finance dependence to proxy for the overall cost of a loan, consisting of the interest rate and the servicing fee in our model. It measures the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations for the median firm in each industry. It is also measured at the sectoral level. Industries which are more dependent on external finance will usually face a larger cost of a loan as they have few other options. For example, holding everything else constant, an industry with high dependence on external finance will have to pay a larger interest rate as it must borrow relatively more than an identical industry which is less reliant on external financing. In a relative sense, a highly dependent industry has less collateral and has to offset the difference by paying a higher cost.
In addition to sectoral level measures, we use one country level measure, the share of private In an underdeveloped financial system costs of borrowing will generally be higher as there are fewer funds to be loaned out. Thus, a lower share of credit in GDP is a proxy for higher costs of borrowing.
Note that we use two proxies for the overall cost of a loan, external finance dependence and the share of credit in GDP or the level of financial development. We do so because unlike asset tangibility, we have no direct measures for the cost of a loan available across countries. One is a cross sector measures, while the other is a cross country measure. We expect them to have opposite signs. The better the financial system, the lower should the cost of a loan be, and the lower should the growth rate be, resulting in an expected negative effect. On the other hand, the greater the dependence on external finance, the higher should the cost of a loan be, and the higher should the growth be, resulting in an expected positive effect.
Results
Our empirical investigation proceeds in several steps. We first examine Proposition ?? as it plays a crucial role in verifying the validity of our model. We then examine the role of credit parameters in the growth as outlined by Proposition 1, followed by examining dynamics of growth as outlined by Proposition 2. We end with an examination of the persistence of the effect of credit constraints on the growth of exports outlined by Proposition 3.
Export Growth
Proposition 1 states that the growth rate of exports will be increasing the more restrictive are the credit constraints. It implies that the growth rate will be decreasing in the level of financial development, a proxy for the cost of a loan or the quality of the exporter's financial system, and increasing in asset tangibility and external financial dependence, a proxy for the overall cost of a loan. We regress the log of the gross growth rate on the three credit constraints parameters, current year in the spell (age of the spell), and initial export volume.
In every regression we include calendar year, spell, and spell length fixed effects. Calendar year fixed effects are included to control for unobserved macroeconomic shocks and correspond to year-specific changes in demand shocks λ y /λ y−1 . Spell fixed effects are used to control for any differences that may arise across multiple instances of positive exports for a particular re-
lationship. An ideal test of our model would entail observing the very first instance of positive exports from a particular country. Such an approach is impractical since it is virtually impossible to know with certainty when the first instance of exports occurs without having much more detailed data than the data available to us. We should note, however, that our model is applicable to any instance when exports begin anew after one or more years of no exports. All we need to be able to identify is the first year of a spell, not the first year of the truly first spell of exports. 14 Spell length fixed effects are used to control for any differences that exist across spells of various lengths, as it is possible for a four year long spell to be different than a twelve year long spell. Table 2 presents estimates for each European Union member, followed by the EU 12 aggregate and estimates for the United States.
The effect of the three credit constraints variables are as expected for every country. Exports from countries with more developed financial systems, where credit is generally cheaper, grow at a slower rate, as predicted. The slower pace of growth is due to new exporters being able 14 All results we report below hold for the first spell we can completely identify in our data. Calendar year, spell number, and spell length fixed effects included, robust standard errors clustered on relationship in parenthesis with *, **, *** denoting significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. Observations report the number of annual exporter-product observations, spells report the total number of spells with positive exports of various length, and relationships report the total number of active export relationships analyzed. Table 2 : Export Growth and Credit Constraints to obtain larger loans to finance initially larger export volumes. We also control for the initial volume of exports which have a negative effect on the growth rate -the larger the initial volume, the slower the growth. The significant effects of both the initial volume of exports and financial development indicate that the effect of the level of financial development on growth through reducing the initial volume of exports is stronger than the pure effect of a smaller initial volume.
A greater reliance on external finance increases the rate of growth of exports to every country in our sample, as predicted by the model. Firms which depend more on external finance grow at a faster rate as they enjoy a greater benefit from proving themselves as exporters.As they start to export their greater reliance on external finance makes banks more leery of lending to them as they are perceived as riskier. Once they prove themselves, the banks' reluctance is reduced allowing them to grow at a faster rate as the relative increase in financing available them allows them to increase exports at a greater rate.
Asset tangibility increases the growth of exports to every country, as predicted by the model.
Since firms with more tangible assets are more likely to stop to prove themselves as unsuccessful exporters, banks will be leery to lend to them, forcing them to start with smaller volumes. As a result, those exports will grow faster. 15 
Dynamics of Export Growth Rates
Proposition 2 states that growth rates decrease as the spell survives and that they converge across exporters as duration increases. The estimated coefficient on the current year in the spell in Table 2 confirms the first part of the proposition, that growth rates decrease over time. We now offer evidence on the second part.
15 NOTE TO SELF: All these effects are described as if they operate by having an effect on the initial volumes. Thus, we should find empirically that all these variables should have opposite effect on levels. But that is not true. Perhaps we need to tone down the explanation of the channel through which this is having an effect. UNLESS we can argue that levels are determined by factors we cannot control for, such as the number of entrants, etc.
One approach to examining convergence of growth rates is to calculate the standard deviation and regress it on the current year in the spell. A difficulty with this approach is that it does not control for the nominal size of growth rates. This is particularly problematic given the first part of proposition 2 that growth rates decrease with the current year in the spell. When comparing all spells this implies that the average growth rate across all exporters is decreasing as spells survive. It is reasonable to expect that the standard deviation is decreasing as well. We instead calculate the coefficient of variation by dividing the standard deviation of the growth rate across exporters of every product in every year in the spell with the average growth rate in that year.
When doing so we only include products with at least five exporters in a year in the spell. We regress the coefficient of variation on the duration of exports and include spell number and spell length fixed effects, as well as the industry fixed effects at the 2-digit SITC level. Industry (2-digit SITC), spell number, and spell length fixed effects included, robust standard errors clustered by products in parentheses with *, **, *** denoting significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. Observations report the number of annual product observations, while products report the number of products analyzed. Table 3 collects our results. We expect the coefficient on the year in spell to be negative if growth rates are indeed converging across exporters. This is the case for exports to all thirteen countries in the sample. The estimated coefficient on the year in spell provides strong evidence that growth rates converge over time as predicted by the model. 16 
The Persistence of Credit Constraints
Our final investigation consists of examining the growth regression not across the lifespan of a spell, but separately for each year in the spell to verify Proposition 3. Equations (16) and (17) imply that credit constraints parameters play a crucial role in the first year of growth, but become progressively less important beyond the first year as successful firms obtain access to other (cheaper) sources of financing and outweigh new entrants in terms of the volume of exports. We expect to find a decreased role of financial market variables on the growth as the duration of a spell increases.
We replicate regressions from Table 2 for exports to each country for each year in spell. In other words, for each country, we replicate our regression for year two in the spell alone, the first year in which we can observe growth. We do so for year three alone, year four alone, and so on until the last possible observed year. Rather than reporting the estimates for the 161 regressions we have performed, we present a summary table where we report the number of years in which each coefficient is significant and of the appropriate sign. We do so in two ways: we report the number of consecutive years from the start of a spell and the total number of years in which coefficients are of the appropriate sign and are significant. We are interested in the latter to investigate whether the first year in which coefficient are not as predicted by the model is an exception or a rule. Our results are summarized in Table 4 .
The initial volume of exports has a rather persistent effect on the growth rate of exports. The External finance dependence has a significant and positive effect for one or two initial years of growth and an average of three years overall. Asset tangibility has a significant effect usually in the first year alone and for an average of three years overall.
Conclusion
The role of credit constraints in international trade is not relevant only to the volume of trade and various aspects of extensive and intensive margins of trade. They also play an important role in determining the growth of trade at a highly disaggregated product level as we have documented in this paper.
Using a dynamic partial equilibrium model we derive several testable predictions. Exports from more credit constrained firms will grow faster, while the growth rate of all exporters decreases over time. In addition, the growth rate converges across all exporters of the same variety.
Finally, the role of credit constraints in determining the growth rate is not persistent: as the export relationship survives, credit constraints become irrelevant to its growth. We test and confirm these predictions using highly disaggregated export data to the United States recorded at the 10-digit HS level and the twelve members of the European Union recorded at the 8-digit CN level.
The reduced role of credit constraints over time points to their large role at the margin for new export relationships. Credit constraints are an immensely important and debilitating initial barrier. They reduce the initial volume of exports by limiting the ability of constrained firms to finance their activities. However, as our results show, the debilitating effect seems to disappear relatively quickly, within first three years of an export relationship. The immediate policy implication of this result is that subsidizing credit for first-time exporters may allow them to overcome the initial barrier imposed by credit constraints. Of course, the design of such an ultimately export promotion policy has to overcome mixed results of such policies. agencies have on average a strong and statistically significant impact on exports. Of course, most of these policies were not designed along the lines of our results, that they are available to new and young exporters, not to all manners of exporter. Our paper adds a new dimension to assess and design such policies, for we study how long financial barriers to exporting persist.
Our study suggests that a policy of promoting exports through easing of credit constraints is needed only in early stages of a firm's exporting endeavor as credit constraints play no role in the growth of exports once a firm becomes successful. 
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